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[The author is an economics professor at Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana's Xochimilco
campus and Centro de Ecodesarrollo research director. This is the first part of two. The second part
of will be published in the 01/20/93 issue of SourceMex.] Introduction Rural Mexico has changed
dramatically. After more than fifty years of land distributions and peasant mobilizations, the typical
village is no longer a cohesive and closed social unit and peasants working in a system of rain-fed
agriculture are no longer the main source of maize for the nation. As the country grapples with
integration into a North American free trade area, rural Mexico is poised to change again. The
government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari has promulgated a new legal framework for agrarian
relations and opened the countryside to the virtually unfettered operation of private capital, both
domestic and foreign. The institutional context The agrarian reform mandated by Article 27 of
the 1917 Constitution was a revolutionary response to demands of "tierra y libertad" (land and
liberty), shouted by peasant insurgents. The land distribution program began in earnest 17 years
later in 1934, with the accession of Lazaro Cardenas to the presidency. By 1990, more than half
of the country's total rural area had been distributed to ejidatarios and colonists. The more than
3 million beneficiaries, who make up the "social sector" in Mexican agriculture, were a major
factor contributing to the country's political stability. As recently as 1990, they accounted for
55% of total domestic maize production. They control 20 million hectares of arable land (more
than half of the total) and are engaged in an increasingly intense struggle, as the neo-liberal
policies of modernization through international economic integration threaten their survival.
Institutional stability and rural growth Until recently, a basic feature of rural Mexico was its
remarkable stability. The modern revival of the ejido in rural Mexico led to the construction of the
strongest pillars of corporatist state control over society. Once begun, the land distribution policy
offered important rewards to virtually all sectors of Mexican society: the fortunate peasants who
received their inalienable plots with permanent usufruct rights enjoyed a new measure of freedom.
This undoubtedly motivated them to labor diligently to make their lands produce and improve their
families' welfare; and the nation enjoyed a new-found sense of security as the yields on peasanttilled and commercial crops rose dramatically. Mexico discovered food self-sufficiency with rising
nutritional standards could be achieved. The nation's burgeoning urbanized labor force was assured
of unlimited supplies of cheap food, which had the additional effect of facilitating the imposition
of wage restraints during the decade of the 1960s and contributing to the high profit rates that
spurred investment throughout the economy. All these factors contributed to the "Mexican miracle,"
which was widely celebrated at the time. Rising food production reinforced domestic prosperity,
and together with rapid import substituting industrialization and the growth of the service sectors
(medicine, education and the bureaucracy), a broad internal market was created. Government
development policies also broadened the scope of the market. They created new industries and
brought isolated regions into the national economy through extensive irrigation programs emulating
the highly acclaimed US Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Agricultural exports began to diversify
as foreign brokers joined with local elites to introduce new crops and finance more intensive fruit
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and vegetable production in the nation's most promising irrigation districts. In the nation's tropical
rain forests, development went unbridled, causing great harm to the jungle, and introducing
extensive cattle grazing to feed the middle classes's new found appetite for meat. All too soon this
strategy proved very costly, not only in terms of its ecological impacts, but also because of its low
economic returns to many of the investors involved in the wholesale forest destruction. The erosion
of peasant support Throughout the countryside, these commercial ventures created a new sense
of movement, of economic growth, while their protagonists imperiously trampled on the rights
and the resources of the rightful claimants to the nation's wealth. Captive peasant communities
struggled to free themselves from the yoke of local bosses (caciques). Myriad indigenous groups
struggled to maintain their identity and survive in a rapidly changing global marketplace. The
rural population peasants, indigenous groups, colonists was not passive in the face of attacks by
influential provincial bosses and inequitable national policies. The official National Campesino
Confederation (Confederacion Nacional Campesina, CNC) offered little hope for local groups
attempting to protect themselves, but other competing organizations responded to the spontaneous
dissatisfaction with the forms progress was taking in rural Mexico. Peasant organizations were
joined by urban supporters to counteract the policies that benefitted the urban rich. Once food selfsufficiency was achieved and celebrated in a presidential discourse in 1962, official price structures
and other official policies turned more strongly against basic food production. Peasants had few
productive alternatives; lacking access to credit and the full range of material inputs and technical
skills required to diversify their production, they were forced to submit to the decisions which
froze or lowered price support levels for basic foods for more than a decade. At the same time,
expansion of government rural support programs was directed toward stimulating commercial crop
production in the best endowed regions. Repeatedly, between 1970 and 1990, peasants expressed
discontent with the state policies and repression that were rapidly eroding the gains of past eras.
In two departures from the historical trend, special, short stop-gap programs were enacted to
respond to their demands and the growing problem of food imports: In 1973, the state-run basic
foodstuffs processing and marketing company (Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares,
CONASUPO) created compensatory policies to stimulate basic food production among peasant
groups and to provide welfare assistance to the neediest; In 1980, the president briefly captured
the world's imagination with the Mexican Food System (Sistema Alimentario Mexicano, SAM), an
innovative program that claimed to strengthen the peasant sector and regain food self-sufficiency,
which had been sacrificed to demands to maintain food prices low during the previous 15 years.
Political intrigue and outright corruption proved its undoing and paved the way for a much
more serious attack against the small farmers. The response to crisis With the "discovery" of the
debt crisis and the imposition of a draconian stabilization program in 1982, the official support
programs for the peasantry (input subsidies and more adequate prices) went the way of almost all
government programs oriented towards the less privileged. The initial waves of cuts in spending
left agricultural extension agents without an operational budget and marginal peasant producers
without credit. Further reorganizations led to massive reductions in government personnel and a
gradual withdrawal from the countryside. By the early 1990s, producers were told they would be
responsible for hiring their own advisors and the newly privatized banking system was assigned
the task of financing production and the official agricultural credit bank further restricted its
lending to risky borrowers. As the criteria of profitability permeated the economy, it became
obvious that basic food production and the traditional producer were not good credit risks. With
the opening of domestic markets to imports in every area except maize and beans, the magnitude
of the attack against the small farmer, and even many medium-sized grain producers, became
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evident throughout rural society. The case of sorghum is particularly revealing. It was introduced as
a promising alternative crop into Mexico (where it was previously unknown) by private capital in the
mid-1960s and promptly adopted by wealthier farmers in the north as a way to escape the imperious
official price controls on maize. Despite a relation to maize, yields on the new hybrid seeds were
greater. Sorghum was also well adapted to harsher climates than maize, its cultivation could be
mechanized, and there was no incentive for the "midnight harvests" that plagued maize farmers
(whose crop did not require processing to be consumed), as the grain was destined exclusively for
animal feed. With the growth of "factory-raised" chickens and intensive hog-fattening operations,
demand for feed burgeoned and sorghum cultivation responded. Although Ralston-Purina offered
guaranteed prices for the sorghum, only a venturesome few began sowing the grain; it proved a
great commercial success and rapidly spread to a widening circle of farmers, occupying as much
as one-quarter of the nation's best maize lands by the mid-1970s. As might be predicted by an
outside analyst, once the crop became a popular product, its profitability fell and the state entered
to control the market. The initial innovators moved on to sow other commercial crops (especially
vegetables), while the remaining sorghum farmers attempted to develop a balance between various
commercial and subsistence crops. However, the remaining sorghum farmers were repeatedly
frustrated by unfulfilled official promises of adequate credit, delivery of fertilizers and other inputs
and market guarantees. With the opening of local markets to imports in 1990, sorghum growers
joined with soybean producers in major protest actions in many parts of rural Mexico. These
generally futile attempts to obstruct the present government's international integration program
illustrate the difficulties facing the majority of small farmers in the new policy environment. The
opening of markets and the privatization of credit and technical assistance were not the only major
policy changes of recent years. A program of "agro-maquilas" offered the highly capitalized agroindustrialists from the southwest US unparalleled opportunities to produce fruits and vegetables
under highly profitable conditions in Mexico's most productive irrigation districts. The opening
of local markets to imports of farm equipment went hand in hand with the gradual deregulation
of biotechnology and the seed industry. In sum, Mexican agriculture is in the throes of a neoliberal restructuring designed to bring unparalleled economic opportunities to those prepared to
take advantage of the moment. Remaking of the Constitution for international integration These
changes appear to have been a prelude to one of the most far reaching of the institutional changes
in rural Mexico: the rewriting of the Mexican Constitution's Article 27. In November 1991, Salinas
announced his intention to send a draft of his proposal for a new text for this cornerstone of rural
society to the congress. In just two months, the draft was approved by both houses of congress,
rubber-stamped by the legislatures of all 31 of the states, and became part of the Constitution in
January 1992. Shortly thereafter, enabling legislation (La Ley Reglamentaria) was promulgated
after a perfunctory debate in the congress. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this process,
was the tepid reaction that this far-reaching legislation aroused among the peasantry. As might be
expected, the various opposition groups, within the formal political system and without, organized
protests and mobilized small coteries of experts on rural affairs to offer their opinions about the
destructive nature of the proposal. In the final analysis, Salinas exercised his considerable power
to recast the legal framework within which rural development and struggle will take place in the
coming years. Three significant changes were introduced with this legislation. The most widely
commented upon modification is the new ease with which ejidos or groups of ejidatarios can
now enter into commercial agreements to finance production on their lands. Although there are
nominal limits on the area any one group may control, the very nature of corporations would make
these restrictions inoperative in even the most rigid and honest of legal systems. The most widely
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denounced change is the facility by which individual beneficiaries of the land reform program may
now alienate title to their land, by direct sale, mortgage or other commercial figure. This creates the
possibility for a reconcentration of land holdings throughout Mexico. The third innovation is the
decision to not permit communal lands to be sold or mortgaged in the new setting, but rather to
permit long-term leasing arrangements, with the approval of as few as one-third of the members
of the community. This change is particularly important because a major part of the total land
distributed under the agrarian reform program was given in communal title to the community
as a whole. Virtually all the ejidal holdings in forests, rain forests and pasture lands exist under
communal arrangements and can now be freed up for private appropriation under this new regime.
These profound changes in the agrarian legislation must be understood in the context of the single
most important initiative of the present administration: the creation of a trinational North American
free trade area. For quite some time, in entrepreneurial circles, the ejidal system has been seen as a
major stumbling block in promoting the free flow of capital among Mexico's partners. With the legal
strictures removed, the Salinas administration hopes to attract large inflows of private investment
capital to reshape agricultural production as a major dynamic force in rebuilding the Mexican
economy. NAFTA negotiations made this patently clear: aside from a relatively protectionist regime
for maize and beans, the rest of Mexican agriculture will be subjected to the ruthless discipline
of the free market after a relatively short adjustment process. Although numerous escape clauses
and restrictive procedures exist, an analysis of the reactions of the major transnational players
in the agricultural sector suggests that safeguards such as quotas on the imports of basic food
grains and dried milk will play a relatively minor role in protecting small and even mediumsize Mexican producers from intense competition by well capitalized foreign counterparts. The
limits of institutional diagnosis and control At the national, regional and local levels, any capacity
to predict policy outcomes is perforce a function of a theory of the Mexican state, the political
process and demographics. But more than ever before, contemporary policymakers are wearing
ideological blinders, cut from the cloth of their neo-liberal doctrines, which leads to incorrect or
partial diagnoses of current problems. As a result, there is a growing gap between the "official
story" and reality, as perceived by important social groups. This is best illustrated by a relatively
simple issue: the importance of urban areas in Mexico's population. The federal statistics agency
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica, INEGI), certifies, on the basis of the
1990 population census, that Mexico is a predominantly urban country, with 76% of the population
living in areas of more than 15,000 people. But Mexico's social reality does not correspond to
this statistical image. A substantial part of Mexico's urban labor force actually works to provide
sustenance for rural relatives and to guarantee their ability to "stay down on the farm." This is
also true of a large number of migrants to the US, whose remittances end up in rural households.
Such is the magnitude of this phenomenon, that in many communities in central Mexico that
send migrants abroad, the dollar is less expensive than in the capital city because of the seemingly
limitless quantities of bank notes arriving from the north. This definition of the degree of a country's
"urbanness", for example, has misled policymakers. The current attack against traditional, low
productivity rural producers is beginning to encounter opponents and even resentment from
people living far from these areas. With agricultural credit increasingly restricted only 16% of
the maize producers received any form of credit in 1990, compared to 38% who did so in each of
the previous 5 years it is no wonder that many urban residents are asking who is to blame for the
stagnation in agricultural yields in rain-fed agriculture during the past two decades. Small-scale
farmers are in the difficult position of trying to bridge the broad chasm between their aspirations of
local food self-sufficiency and the reality of insufficient jobs and very low wages for most workers.
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Urbanites bemoan the threat of further waves of rural migrants, while farmers are forced into the
urban underground economy to eke out a living because the government's offer of insignificant
social welfare programs creates no new productive opportunities for rural communities. In other
situations, erroneous figures deceive the policy makers while they protect and even reward the
perpetrators of fraud. Capital flight is a particularly egregious example of this problem. During
the height of the country's economic instability in the years 1973-1983, foreign trade provided a
mechanism for transferring funds out of the country or evading taxes. The agricultural sector lends
itself well to transactions where the erroneous (over or under) valuation of products by fractions of
a cent per pound can represent sizable commissions for astute and unethical intermediaries. For
Mexico, the problem of the misreporting of trade amounted to more than 12.5% of total value of
foreign trade in 1979-1985. Unfortunately, policymakers consistently denied the existence of any
problem and continue to be unprepared to face its consequences. In the 1990s, when the business
community is attempting to design strategies to defend itself against the government's policy of
"fiscal terrorism" and the government remains inflexible in its defense of the stability of the peso,
it is likely that many people are again resorting to misreporting the value of foreign trade as a way
of evading domestic taxes and hedging against adverse economic changes in Mexico. In Mexico
today, the dangers arising from an incorrect assessment of the country's economic and political
health are especially great. While taking advantage of the generous profit opportunities which
the regime has created, the world's capitalist community is rushing to congratulate Mexico for
its successes while overlooking its weaknesses. Large segments of the academic community, at
home and abroad, also are uncritically celebrating as the country announces its progress in stifling
inflation, reducing unemployment, increasing exports, and raising wages, as it marches headlong on
the road towards the first world. The optimistic analyses pour out even while there are widespread
indications of profound social problems, such as a shrinking internal market, growing income
disparities, increased crime, more migration to the US, environmental pollution, underemployment
and profound lack of public confidence in policy and policymakers. In rural Mexico, the lack of
understanding of the real situation is especially troubling. The government has imposed a single
economic policy, narrowly guided by the principles of the free market and rooted in an absolute
faith in the power of the international marketplace to discipline errant participants. Although
the theory requires that the participants "play on a level field", Mexican policymakers seem to
ignore the importance of the profound economic, cultural and productive differences among the
competitors within Mexico and even more so with those from abroad. The profound modifications in
the agrarian situation in recent years, resulting from the lowering of trade barriers, the deregulation
of domestic commodity markets and the recent creation of a land market, create a dramatically
different playing field. But the Mexican peasants are unprepared to play by the new rules.

-- End --

©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 5 of 5

